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Since the EU is bound by the EU Charter of fundamental rights due to the 
amended Treaty of the European Union, the critical points of companies’ 
fundamental rights in competition proceeding has generated a large number 
of legal debates. This article evaluates whether changes to the current 
competition enforcement are necessary as to comply with EU fundamental 
rights standards. This article discusses the paradox between the EU 
competition enforcement and companies’ fundamental rights protection. In 
author’s view, the EU should comply with EU fundamental rights law, 
particularly due to the Charter’s binding effects on the EU. The case law 
concerning EU competition law has reflected compliance with the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Nevertheless, the effective competition 
enforcement is still necessary for an undistorted market and will ultimately 
maintain a well-functioning market. This brings a result to consumer welfare, 
which is another kind of protection of fundamental rights. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Fundamental rights’ compliance of public enforcement in European Union 
(EU) competition law is a particularly complicated issue.1 Competition public 
enforcement in the EU may considerably affect the protection of suspected 
companies’ fundamental rights, and reasons underlying include that the 
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European Commission (Commission) holds investigation and first-instance 
decision-making powers to sanction penalties to companies’ illegal antitrust 
infringements. Procedural rules dictating the competition enforcement by the 
Commission are in Regulation 1/2003 and Regulation 773/2004, together 
with abundant notices or guidelines, such as: Guidelines on setting fines and 
the Leniency Notice.2 Among all these norms, Regulation 1/2003 plays a key 
role in providing various kinds of powers that the Commission carries. 
Pursuant to this Regulation, for the purpose of applying Articles 101 and 102 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which 
prohibit cartels and the abuse of a dominant market position respectively, the 
Commission holds the power to deal with the antitrust cases in the EU.  
 
Articles 17 to 21 of Regulation 1/2003 stipulate the Commission’s 
investigation powers. These provisions regulate the power of the 
Commission’s request for information that is necessary for determining 
antitrust cases,3 and the Commission may also interrogate natural or legal 
person as to collect the information.4 Moreover, the Commission is able to 
exercise its powers of inspection by means of entering and sealing any 
premises according to the Regulation. On the condition that undertakings are 
found to be illegal after the Commission’s inspection, they might face fines 
as penalties. Due to this, the Commission’s investigative, prosecutorial and 
adjudicative powers which are highly related to companies’ legal and 
financial status, such as the interest of property and the freedom to conduct 
commercial activities. Thus, they may violate companies’ fundamental rights, 
which are fundamental values of the EU.  
 
While the Commission makes decisions on higher fines, the situation 
becomes that it is not judges but administrative body decides to impose fines.5 
Consequently, because this kind of sanction has the deterrent and punitive 
effects, the competition proceedings are an administrative process, yet they 
contain criminal charges. Accordingly, since Article 6 of the European 
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Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) provides 
that “in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing […] by 
an independent and impartial tribunal”, the standard under Article 6 of the 
ECHR becomes the judicial remedy for antitrust defendants.  
 
Having regard to the tension between the competition enforcement and 
companies’ fundamental rights, the crucial issue is to what extent the 
suspected companies' fundamental rights are respected by the Commission in 
its investigation processes and whether the Commission’s implementation is 
consistent with the fundamental rights within the EU legal order. This critical 
issue has arisen from two developments in the EU. First of all, one must 
consider the increased importance of fundamental rights protection after the 
implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon: the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union (EUCFR) became legally binding on the EU, when 
the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in 2009.6 Although the EU is not yet 
bound by the ECHR, both the Convention and the Charter are instruments 
that establish the fundamental rights legal order, because of Article 52(3) of 
the EUCFR.7 Accordingly, since Article 6 of the ECHR corresponds to 
Article 47 of the EUCFR, the right to a fair trial and effective judicial remedy 
provided by Article 6 of the ECHR is applicable in the EU. Moreover, recital 
37 in Regulation 1/2003 implies that this Regulation has to be applied with 
respect to those principles and rights stated in the EUCFR. Therefore, it could 
be concluded that the Commission’s competition enforcement must be 
compliant with the Convention and the Charter. 
Secondly, pursuant to Article 23(2) Regulation 1/2003, the Commission 
carries the discretionary power to impose fines on undertakings and 
associations of undertakings. As a consequence, there are increased sanctions 
imposed on companies, when the Commission deals with antitrust cases 
relating to Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU. Looking at the Commission’s 
statistics, the total amount of fines imposed on illegal cartels between 2000 
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and 2014 has increased approximately three-fold to 8.7 billion euros.8 The 
fines of the truck producers case9 levied for infringing Article 101 of the 
TFEU appears to be the highest individual monetary sanction. 
 
The requirements of fundamental rights protection in competition 
proceedings include the right to a fair trial and a fair administrative process 
stated in Articles 41 and 47 of the EUCFR.10 The procedural rights standards 
guaranteed by Article 6 of the ECHR focus on a person’s civil rights or 
defence of criminal charge against him by way of a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal. In the case 
law of the Court of Justice in the European Union (CJEU) concerning the 
competition enforcement, the CJEU upheld the essence of fundamental rights 
protection in, for example, the Alrosa judgment,11 which affirmed that 
companies’ fundamental rights should be heard during the commitment 
proceeding. In addition to that case, there are increased cases demonstrating 
the tension between the fundamental rights of companies and the 
Commission’s enforcement procedure, such as the KME12and the Chalkor 
cases.13 These cases imply that the Commission’s decisions on fines fall 
within the control of a judicial body, which has the full jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, there is compliance with a fair trial required by Article 6 of the 
ECHR. 
 
This article aims to analyse the case law concerning the companies’ 
fundamental rights in EU competition law before the EU Courts and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) from two essential aspects: the 
right to a fair trial from the General Court (GC) when reviewing the 
Commission’s decisions on fines, as well as the companies’ rights to be heard. 
Subsequently, this work will evaluate whether changes to the current 
competition enforcement are necessary, in order to comply with fundamental 
                                                      
8 DG Competition, ‘Cartel Statistics’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf> accessed 23 September 
2016. 
9 European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission fines truck producers € 2.93 billion for 
participating in a cartel’ (Press release, 19 July 2016) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-16-2582_en.htm> accessed 23 September 2016. 
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rights standards in the EU. Section II explores the background of the EU 
fundamental rights protection scheme, i.e. the ECHR and the EUCFR, 
followed by the necessity of companies’ fundamental rights protection 
brought by the discussion of the EU’s accession to the ECHR. Section III 
depicts the critical points by means of case law from the fairness of rights to 
a fair trial and a fair hearing, and Section IV will declare that current 
enforcement system may be compatible with effective fundamental rights 
protection.14 This article, however, discusses a balance between the effective 
EU competition enforcement and companies’ fundamental rights protection. 
 
 
II. EU Law and Companies’ Fundamental Rights Protection 
 
1. Fundamental Rights Protection after the Treaty of Lisbon 
 
The development of embedding of fundamental rights norms in EU law is 
prosperous after the Treaty of Lisbon.15 The position before the Treaty of 
Lisbon was that the EU should respect fundamental rights as enshrined by the 
ECHR, and as they were derived from the constitutional traditions common 
to the Member States as EU law foundational general principles, pursuant to 
Article 6(2) of the TEU.16 To a further extent, the EU Courts must take into 
account the case law of the ECtHR according to Article 6(3) of the TEU. In 
this regard, EU fundamental rights norms develop to a greater extent 
acquiring a positive function, alongside their more disciplinary and traditional 
role.17  
Initially in Stauder, the CJEU stated that it had the competence to rule on the 
case of fundamental rights protection in the EU. This case indicated that the 
respect for fundamental rights is included in the general principles of EU 
law.18 This ruling was subsequently upheld in the Internationale 
                                                      
14 This protection scheme is guaranteed by Articles 41 and 47 of the EUCFR, which are 
afforded by Article 6(1) of the ECHR. 
15 Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (5th edn OUP 2011) 
364. 
16 Piet Eeckhout, ‘Human Rights and the Autonomy of EU Law: Pluralism or Integration?’ 
(2013) 66(1) Current Legal Problems 174. 
17 Ibid 177. 
18 Case 29/69 Stauder para 7. 
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Handelsgesellschaft case, in which the CJEU declared that respect for 
fundamental rights constitutes a component of the general principles 
protected by the Court. In addition, the judgment emphasised the importance 
of the protection, which was derived from the constitutional traditions of the 
Member States and must be guaranteed within the framework and objectives 
of the EU.19 Furthermore, in the Nold case, the CJEU confirmed and added 
that international treaties for the protection of fundamental rights collaborated 
on or signed by the Member States should also be secured in EU law.20 
Finally, the importance of the ECHR is explicitly recognised in Rutili, and the 
judgment stated that the general fundamental principles of EU law could be 
found in the ECHR.21 These CJEU’s judgments concerning the respect for 
fundamental rights led to a debate on whether or not the EU should accede to 
the ECHR.22 Later in 1994, the Council sought the opinion of the CJEU (then 
the ECJ) dealing with the accession of the EU (then the EC) to the ECHR.23 
In Opinion 2/94, the CJEU confirmed the ECHR’s particular position among 
international fundamental rights treaties. Yet it also indicated that the EU’s 
accession to the ECHR was impossible, on the grounds that the EU had no 
competence to accede without amending the EU Treaty.24  
With respect to the EU’s pending accession to the ECHR, the issue 
concerning the relationship between EU law and the Convention has been 
continuously discussed and remains open. The prominent Bosphorus25case 
stated that the Member States, according to their obligations of EU law, may 
have a defence against the violation of fundamental rights, because the CJEU 
carries the identical system of protection as the ECtHR. This outcome could 
                                                      
19 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle Für Getreide 
Und Futtermittel, para 4. 
20 Case 4/73 J Nold, Kohlen-und Baustoffgrosshandlung v Commission para 13. 
21 Case 36/75 Roland Rutili v The Minister for The Interior para 32.  
22 See Jean-Paul Jacqué, ‘The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 995; 
Tobias Lock, ‘Walking on a Tightrope: The Draft ECHR Accession Agreement and the 
Autonomy of the EU Legal Order’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1025; Giorgio 
Gaja, ‘Accession to the ECHR’, in Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout and Stephanie Ripley (eds) 
EU Law After Lisbon (OUP 2012). 
23 Further comments on Opinion 2/94, see Giorgio Gaja, ‘Opinion 2/94, Accession by the 
Community to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’, 
(1996) 33 Common Market Law Review 973. 
24 Opinion 2/94 paras 27 and 35. 
25 Bosphorus Hava Yollan Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland, No 45036.  
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be interpreted as a consequence of the consolidation of the EU fundamental 
rights discourse achieved in past years and of the important role played by the 
ECtHR itself in setting up the principles applied in this context by the CJEU.26 
The most recent development arose from the Opinion 2/13, in which a draft 
accession agreement was submitted to the CJEU as to obtain an opinion 
pursuant to Article 218(11) of the TFEU.27  
The draft agreement had envisaged arrangements that were made to address 
issues of the EU’s inactive position before the ECtHR and the possible 
participation of the EU judiciary with respect to claims involving the EU and 
addressed before the ECtHR.28 According to Advocate General Kokott’s 
opinion regarding the Opinion 2/13, she supported the standing claimed by 
both of the Commission and the Council that such an accession is unlikely to 
have an impact on the competition enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 of 
the TFEU.29 She particularly examined three issues. First of all, she 
reaffirmed that sanction scheme of a competition authority that is entitled to 
judicial review has been upheld by the ECtHR.30 Secondly, the draft 
accession agreement does not contain rules against double jeopardy, since 
under the draft accession agreement, the EU was established to accede only 
to the ECHR and the first Protocol.31 The third issue concerned the principle 
enshrined in Article 6 of the ECHR, which equally proves the principles of 
Article 41 and 47 of the EUCFR. AG Kokott addressed that the draft 
accession agreement would not necessitate institutional changes, irrespective 
of the breach of this principle by the Commission and the GC. To conclude, 
in AG Kokott’s view, the draft accession agreement is compatible with the 
EU treaties with a certain number of safeguards.32     
                                                      
26 Joseph Phelps, ‘Reflections on Bosphorus and Human Rights in Europe’ (2006) 81 Tulane 
Law Review 275-276. 
27 Opinion 2/13 re ECHR Accession EU:C:2014:2454. 
28 Arianna Andreangeli, EU Competition Enforcement and Compliance with Fundamental 
Rights’ Standards: The Challenge and the Promise of Accession to the ECHR   
<https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/eu-competition-enforcement-and-
compliance-with-fundamental-rights-standards-the-challenge-and-the-promise-of-
accession-to-the-echreu-competition-enforcement-and-compliance-with-fundamental-
rights-stan/> accessed 23 September 2016. 
29 Paras 146-156 in AG Kokott’s Opinion re Opinion 2/13, 13 June 2014, EU:C:2014:2475.  
30 Menarini Diagnostics v Italy No 43509/09 [2011]. 
31 See Article 4 of Protocol 7. 
32 Peter Oliver and Thomas Bombois, ‘Competition and Fundamental Rights’ (2015) Journal 
of European Competition Law and Practice 1-2. 
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2. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
 
Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, the EUCFR was enacted according to the 
fundamental rights outlined in European and international agreements (for 
example the ECHR), and the Member States’ national constitutions, which 
the CJEU drew upon when formulating the general principles of law and 
fundamental rights in EU law since the 1970s.33 
The EUCFR has become legally binding because of the amended Article 6(1) 
of the TEU. The provision stipulates that the Charter, which establishes the 
political, social and economic rights of EU citizens, has equal legal value to 
the TEU and TFEU.34 The EUCFR creates the obligation for the EU to 
provide full respect to enshrined fundamental rights. For example, the right 
to a fair hearing stipulated in Article 41 of the EUCFR as well as the right to 
a fair judicial review in Article 47 of the EUCFR. Due to this, the EU courts 
must resolve the question of whether or not the competition proceedings are 
compliant with the standard of Article 6(1) of the ECHR, incorporated in both 
Articles 41 and 47 of the EUCFR, with the reference to the ECtHR’s case 
law. The EUCFR does not truly contain any definition of the criminal charge. 
However, due to the intensive relationship between the EUCFR and the 
ECHR, the clearest approach would be to use the definition of the term 
“criminal” outlined in the ECHR as the notion of this term in the EUCFR.35 
3. Companies’ Fundamental Rights Protection in the EU 
 
This article will not extensively focus on companies’ fundamental rights 
protection under the EU fundamental rights legal order. Instead, this article 
                                                      
33 Paul Craig, ‘EU Accession to the ECHR: Competence, Procedure and Substance’ (2013) 
36 Fordham International Law Journal 1141-1142. 
34 David Anderson and Cian Murphy ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights’ in Andrea Biondi, 
Piet Eeckhout and Stephanie Ripley (eds) EU Law After Lisbon (OUP 2012) 161-162. 
35 Wouter Wils, Principles of European Antitrust Enforcement (Hart Publishing, 2005) 77. 
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examines more specifically the EU competition law enforcement system and 
its compliance with Article 6(1) of the ECHR. 
In Niemitz, the ECtHR has stated that, among the entire ECHR, Article 6 can 
apply to both natural and legal persons, such as companies.36 The ECHR has 
recognised the business freedom, such as the right to receive and impart 
information, and the right to peaceful enjoyment of the property. This 
recognition demonstrates the importance of business freedom as a perspective 
of the democratic society on which the ECHR is established. In this context, 
there is a critical issue relating to the control of companies in the commercial 
field in which economic rights and freedoms are not unrestricted, thus giving 
rise to the complex legal system for regulating the commercial activities of 
private enterprises.37 Consequently, because of the objectives of the ECHR, 
according to which companies are subject to seek protection of the right to a 
fair and impartial trial, the companies’ fundamental rights should be put into 
understanding and implementation in the EU. 
It is also clear that according to the ECHR’s text, not every protection of the 
ECHR is equally applicable to legal entities.38 There is indeed a distinction 
between companies’ fundamental rights protection derived from its due 
process rights and the individual’s human rights. This difference justifies a 
restriction on the companies’ fundamental rights protection on the 
requirements concerning the scope and intensity of judicial review of 
competition enforcement decisions.39   
Pursuant to scholars’ observations, the ECHR becomes a legal instrument to 
protect ‘everyone’ from the arbitrary and excessive exercise of authorities’ 
public power, and this implication illustrates a sound justification for the 
application of the ECHR to the advantage of private enterprises, in the 
relevant regulatory scheme.40 The ECHR is indeed inherently applicable to 
companies (and more generally, legal entities) in a limited scope. In view of 
                                                      
36 Niemitz v Germany No 13710/88 [1993]  
37 Arianna Andreangeli EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights (Edward Elgar, 
2008) 17. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Albert Graells, ‘The EU’s Accession to the ECHR and Due Process Rights in EU 
Competition Law Matters: Nothing New Under the Sun?’ 12 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2156904> accessed 23 September 
2016. 
40 Wolfgang Weiß, ‘The EU Competition Policy as an International Human Rights Issue’ in 
Jan Wetzel (eds) The EU as a “Global Player” in Human Rights? (Routledge, 2011) 174.  
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advocating that corporate fundamental rights exist in the ECHR, it has been 
argued that a number of rights have always and without discussion been 
considered as applicable to legal entities, principally the right to the 
enjoyment of procedural rights guarantees in Article 6(1) of the ECHR.41 
Even having contested as such by some authors, Graells claimed that such 
maximalist position requires further review in light of the possible de facto 
configuration of the ECtHR as a third appellate instance in EU competition 
law.42 In other words, if judicial reviews applied by both the GC and the CJEU 
are deemed insufficient, all EU competition law cases could be appealed 
before the ECtHR pursuant to Article 6(1) of the ECHR and possibly Article 
13 of the ECHR as well.43 
Overall, it would be predictable that the EU shall accede into the ECHR. 
Hence, the issue of companies’ fundamental rights in the competition 
enforcement is reflected in recent developments in the case law. Section III 
will subsequently examine whether the competition enforcement system is 
compatible with Article 6 (1) of the ECHR, by means of case law before the 
EU Courts and the ECtHR. 
III. EU Competition Law Enforcement and Companies’ 
Fundamental Rights Protection 
 
1. Overview of EU Competition Enforcement System 
 
EU competition law provides a broad variety of institutional schemes for the 
public enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU at the levels of both 
the EU and the Member States.44 The Commission has provided Guidelines 
outlining the methodology for setting the amount of fines.45 Additionally, the 
Commission has published a Leniency Notice46, where it has commitments 
to give immunity from fines or reduction of fines in cartel cases to companies 
that provide cooperation with the Commission in voluntarily offering 
                                                      
41 Graells (n 39) 10.  
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (4th edn 
OUP, 2011) 1026. 
45 Guideline on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation 
1/2003, [2006] OJ C 210/2. 
46 Notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases [2006] OJ C298/17. 
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intelligence and/or evidence of antitrust infringements, according to the 
criteria stated in the Notice.   
Pursuant to Article 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission is able to 
make a decision on imposing fines on undertakings, which breach Articles 
101 and 102 of the TFEU either intentionally or negligently. Article 23(3) of 
Regulation 1/2003 stipulates that in deciding the amount of fines, it is 
necessary to have regard to the gravity and the duration of the antitrust 
infringement. Owing to the wide discretion power of the Commission in 
complex economic assessments and the consequent inability of an appellant 
to engage in the Court’s discussion on the merits of its economic arguments, 
it appears somehow questionable to assume that an investigative undertaking 
can possibly give an effective remedy for the injustice caused after the 
Commission’s final decision.47 However, in accordance with Article 263 of 
the TFEU stipulating that the legality of acts of the Commission shall be 
amenable to judicial review, while the Commission’s decision is binding on 
the suspected undertakings, the undertakings are able to request an annulment 
of the decision before the GC.  
The Commission carries out a combination of investigative, prosecutorial and 
adjudicative functions and acts as ‘police, prosecutor and judge’.48 All of 
these powers have led to a legal dispute in relation to Article 6(1) of the 
ECHR. The Commission’s discretion powers, particularly in imposing fines, 
may constitute the notion of a ‘criminal charge’ as defined in that provision, 
and then would violate company defendants’ procedural rights protection in 
EU antitrust proceedings. Accordingly, since the Commission is not an 
‘independent and impartial tribunal’ and the ECtHR acknowledges that the 
Commission’s decisions are subject to subsequent judicial control by a court 
that has full jurisdiction and provides the guarantees of Article 6 of the 
ECHR.49 
 
 
                                                      
47 Adrianna (n 37) 177. 
48 Ioannis Lianos and Arianna Andreangeli, ‘Chapter 9: The European Union: The 
Competition Law System and the Union’s Norms’ in Eleanor Fox & Michael Trebilcock 
(eds) The Design of Competition Law Institutions, (OUP, 2012) 390. 
49 Menarini Diagnostics v Italy No 43509/09 [2011] paras 38-44 and 58-59. 
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2. Companies’ Fundamental Rights to a Fair Trial 
 
The nature of the competition proceeding has been broadly disputed. It is 
remarkable that this controversy was probed by the Opinion of the 
Commission on Human Rights in the Stenuit case.50 The Opinion declared 
that fines imposed on undertakings by the administrative authority were 
criminal in nature, because of the nature and severity of the sanction.51 Some 
studies at the 1990s had discussed the assessment of the nature and its 
compliance with the ECHR.52 The debate explored the disputed competition 
proceedings in view of: firstly, how EU competition enforcement involving 
the imposition of a fine would relate to criminal charges within the broader 
autonomous concept in Article 6 of the ECHR, regardless of whether this 
proceeding is or is not categorised as criminal under EU law. Secondly, as the 
Commission is not an independent and impartial trial, its decisions are entitled 
to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction. The critical 
issue is therefore focused on whether the GC exercises full jurisdiction when 
reviewing the Commission’s decisions.53 In this section, this issue will be 
analysed based on these two streams delineated in the debate.  
On the intention of the application of Article 6 of the ECHR, it is essential to 
understand whether or not the Commission’s competition enforcement 
related to Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU is criminal in nature. Although 
Article 23(5) of the Regulation 1/2003 indicates that decisions in which the 
Commission imposes fines on undertakings based on that regulation ‘shall 
not be of a criminal law nature’, this provision is not decisive in determining 
whether procedures pursuant to that regulation are of a criminal nature under 
the ECHR.  
The ECtHR has developed the notion of a criminal charge as an autonomous 
concept that actually belongs to treaty law. Regarding the notion of ‘criminal 
charge’, the ECtHR implicated that the examination of a criminal charge 
relies on substantive factors, which are: ‘the nature and severity of the offence 
                                                      
50 Société Stenuit v France No 11598/85 [1992]. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Denis Waelbroeck and Denis Fosselard, ‘Should the Decision-Making Power in EC 
Antitrust Procedures be left to an Independent Judge- The Impact of the European 
Convention of Human Rights on EC Antitrust Procedures?’ in A Barav and D A Wyatt (eds) 
1994 Yearbook of European Law (Clarendon, 1995). 
53 Ibid. 
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and the penalty’ and ‘the purpose of the fine, for example, the intentions of 
sanctions are both deterrent and punitive’.54 The Engel judgment established 
the ‘Engel Criteria’ - the classification of the offence under national law, the 
nature of the offence, and the nature and severity of the potential penalty. 
There is no implication of any specific degree of seriousness when assessing 
a criminal charge. However, the Engel Criteria provides a distinction between 
a serious and a minor criminal offence (such as tax surcharges or traffic 
offences).55 
Additionally, from the Le Compte, Van Leuven and de Meyere judgment, the 
ECtHR has frequently upheld that the determination of civil rights and 
obligations or criminal offences within the meaning of Article 6 of the ECHR 
can be authorised by administrative proceedings.56 The approach adopted in 
Le Compte Van Leuven and de Meyere stated that the concept of a 
determination of civil rights and obligations and the criminal offences should 
be given a substantive meaning.57 Following this approach, the judgment 
concluded that Article 6(1) of the ECHR should be applicable to all 
proceedings, be they judicial or administrative.58 Moreover, the stand adopted 
in Stenuit supports the argument that the Commission’s proceeding for the 
enforcement of antitrust cases can be assessed to be criminal in nature. It can 
therefore be concluded that the adoption of the ‘substantive’ test and its 
expansion to administrative processes in the area of minor criminal offence 
has allowed the ECtHR to extend the reach of Article 6(1) of the ECHR to a 
diversification of administrative proceedings.59 As a result, when the 
Commission makes the decision to impose fines on companies, it becomes 
important to assure the companies’ rights of defence in administrative 
proceedings, as the rights are the standards of administrative fairness in the 
ECHR.60 This significance can be exemplified by both of the Jussila61 and 
Menarini62 cases.  
a. Case Law 
                                                      
54 Schmautzer v Austria No 15523/89 [1996]. 
55 Engel v Netherlands No 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72, 5370/72 [1979-1980]. 
56 Le Compte, Van Leuven and de Meyere v Belgium No 6878/75; 7238/75 [1982]. 
57 Ibid para 45. 
58 Ibid para 47. 
59 Arianna (n 37) 30. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Jussila v Finland No 73053/01 [2011]. 
62 Menarini (n 49). 
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The Jussila and Menarini cases are both prominent in respect of the interface 
between fines imposed by the Commission in competition proceedings and 
companies’ fundamental rights protection. The Jussila judgment concerns 
with the field of companies’ fundamental rights and its interplay with the EU 
competition enforcement. Therefore, it has an essential meaning. This is not 
only due to the facts of the case, but also because of the levying of fines, 
which relates to the discussion of competition law and the imposition of 
criminal penalties in the first instance by the Commission. The judgment of 
Jussila indicated that ‘the autonomous interpretation adopted by the [ECHR] 
of the notion of a “criminal charge” by applying the Engel criteria have 
underpinned a gradual broadening of the criminal head to cases not strictly 
belonging to the traditional categories of the criminal law, for example 
administrative penalties […]’.63 Through this statement, the ECtHR reassured 
that fines levied on companies for infringements of competition law came 
within the broader and autonomous concept of ‘criminal charge’, yet the 
imposition does not fall under the hardcore criminal law. Accordingly, 
penalties infringing competition law are criminal within the wider 
autonomous meaning of Article 6 of the ECHR but differ from the hard-core 
criminal offences. The criminal-head guarantees provided by Article 6 of the 
ECHR do not necessarily apply with its full stringency outside the hard-core 
of criminal law. 
In that regard, the matter that the Commission, which is not an independent 
and impartial tribunal, has the competence to make decisions and impose 
fines of criminal law nature may be inconsistent with the ECHR.64 By 
contrast, according to Özturk, it is compatible with Article 6 of the ECHR for 
criminal penalties to be imposed in the first instance by an administrative or 
non-judicial body that has both investigative and decision-making powers.65 
This is because there is a possibility of a judicial review that has full 
jurisdiction and the power to annul an administrative body’s decisions, in all 
perspectives of facts and of law.66 
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It is worth noting that, from the view of the compatibility of Article 6(1) of 
the ECHR with a decision by an administrative body that has integrated 
powers, the Jussila case takes the Bendenoun and Janosevic judgments as a 
reference. In both the Bendenoun67 and Janosevic68 cases, the ECtHR put a 
further extent than Özturk. The Court declared that the authorization of 
prosecution and punishment to an administrative body is compatible with the 
ECHR, even the imposition of criminal penalties lead to a substantial amount 
of fines.69 Nonetheless, this implication contradicts the argument provided by 
some scholars that an administrative first-instance decision would merely be 
acceptable for minor infringements.70  
With regard to the judgment in Menarini, it also directly concerns companies’ 
right to a fair trial in the competition enforcement system in Italy. Menarini 
is a company that was sanctioned for an infringement of Italian competition 
law. The Italian competition authority, acting in a similar manner to the 
Commission, holds both investigatory and first-instance decision-making 
powers. Menarini complained that the Italian administrative courts, which 
had heard its appeal against the Italian competition authority had not 
exercised full jurisdiction. 
As in the ruling of the Jussila judgment, the ECtHR confirmed that the 
challenged competition proceedings concerning fines in Menarini fell under 
the criminal head of Article 6 of the ECHR. The provision does not reject a 
first-instance decision on fines by an administrative body, although the 
authority is not an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. This 
is because there is a potential for appeal before a judicial body that has full 
jurisdiction to quash in various perspectives of the decisions of an 
administrative body, such as on questions of facts and law. As a consequence, 
the ECtHR indicated in the judgment that the Italian administrative courts had 
exercised such full jurisdiction.  
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To conclude, it is clear that Article 6(1) of the ECHR, as interpreted by the 
ECtHR in both the Jussila and Menarini cases, does not require amending the 
EU enforcement system. However, it is essential to examine the scope and 
intensity of the GC’s jurisdiction in the cases of fines in the competition 
enforcement, on the grounds that this kind of case involves complex 
economic assessments, which belong to the Commission’s discretionary 
powers.  
 
b. Judicial Review as the Right to a Fair Trial 
 
Jurisprudence of the ECtHR as aforementioned has established that the right 
to a fair trial and due process before an impartial and independent tribunal in 
civil procedures does not preclude some cases of an administrative or 
professional disciplinary nature from being determined by an administrative 
body at the first instance, as long as they are ultimately subject to judicial 
review.71  
Most arguments have been established on the basis of the first paragraph of 
Article 6 of the ECHR.72 The frequent claims are that competition decisions 
involve the determination of civil rights and obligations, and that due to the 
combination of its functions, the Commission is not an “independent and 
impartial tribunal” as Article 6 of the ECHR clearly requires.73 The allegation 
continues on that, although the Commission does not meet the meaning of 
‘independent and impartial tribunal’, it is a de facto tribunal since its decisions 
are binding even if appealed before the GC.  
This outcome can firstly be evaluated by means of the rulings of the KME74 
and Chalkor75 cases. The KME was sanctioned approximately 40 million 
                                                      
71 See the case study of Menarini and Jussila in Section III. 2. a. 
72 See in general, Ian Forrester, ‘Due Process in EC Competition Cases: A Distinguished 
Institution with Flawed Procedure’ (2009) 34 European Law Review 817, and ‘A Challenge 
for Europe’s Judges: The Review of Fines in Competition Cases’ (2011) 36 European Law 
Review 185. 
73 Nicolo Zingales, ‘The Hearing Officer in EU Competition Law Proceedings: Ensuring Full 
Respects for the Right to be Heard?’ 2010 7(1) The Competition Law Review 130. 
74 KME (n 12). 
75 Chalkor (n 13). 
 23 
Euros for its participation in a copper tubes cartel. On its appeal to the CJEU, 
KME complained that the GC permitted excessive discretion to the 
Commission. Advocate-General Sharpton pointed out that KME’s appeal was 
in fact focused on challenging the scope of judicial review, and it argued that 
the amount of fine was too high. Following this claim, she had examined 
whether or not the EU Courts had ‘unlimited jurisdiction’ in reviewing fines. 
She concluded that the scope and intensity of jurisdiction that the EU Courts 
exercised were compatible with the full jurisdiction required under Article 6 
of the ECHR.76 
In KME, the CJEU held that there indeed is a judicial review under Article 
263 of the TFEU. The unlimited jurisdiction of the Court to review the 
Commission’s penalties in respect of Article 261 of the TFEU is consistent 
with the requirements of the principle of effective judicial protection in 
Article 47 of the EUCFR.77 The CJEU followed and adopted a similar 
approach in Chalkor. The judgment of Chalkor stated that even though the 
GC had mentioned that the Commission’s discretion was wide or substantial, 
this did not prevent the GC from exercising an unlimited and unrestricted 
review of the law and facts.78 
However in Otis and Others79, the CJEU considered the judicial review of 
legality under Article 263 of the TFEU in the sphere of competition law to be 
insufficient, owing to the margin discretion that the EU Courts leave to the 
Commission in dealing with economic matters.80 The Court concluded that 
the kind of judicial review outlined by the TFEU still complies with the 
principle of effective judicial protection in Article 47 of the EUCFR.81 In such 
a conclusion, the Court confirmed that in areas of complex economic 
assessments, the Commission has a margin of discretion with regard to 
economic matters. The EU Courts cannot carry out the Commission’s margin 
of discretion, as the method and criteria delineating the powers are mentioned 
in the Commission’s fining guidelines.82 It also added that this respect for the 
Commission’s discretion does not mean that the EU Courts must be 
                                                      
76 KME AG Sharpton Opinion. 
77 KME (n 12) para 133. 
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80 Ibid para 58. 
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prohibited from reviewing the Commission’s interpretation when assessing 
economic matters. The EU Courts must examine not only whether the reliance 
of economic evidence is accurate and reliable, but also whether the evidence 
contains all the information in order to assess a complex situation. It is 
therefore capable of substantiating the conclusion.83 
In view of effective judicial protection in competition enforcement, EU 
competition law has provided for the unlimited jurisdiction to review the 
Commission’s decisions concerning the gravity of fines or periodic penalty 
payments in Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003. In addition, Articles 261 and 
263 of the TFEU can both be demonstrated to give the full jurisdiction in 
competition matters, in particular the cases of imposing fines. The control of 
legality under Article 263 of the TFEU may be viewed as a comprehensive 
method to review the facts and law, and the purpose of this provision is to 
ensure the protection of citizen’s rights. Fines in competition enforcement are 
entitled to unlimited jurisdiction, pursuant to Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003 
in a relationship to Article 261 of the TFEU. In other words, these two 
provisions of the TFEU and Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003 have empowered 
the GC and the CJEU to review the Commission’s decisions in competition 
cases, particularly in terms of the legality of the Commission’s decisions 
dealing with fines. 
Such a legal effect has put further for the discussion concerning fair trial 
requirement of Article 6 of the ECHR and the Commission’s role in carrying 
out the enforcement. This discourse between EU competition enforcement 
and the role of the EU Courts in terms of their judicial review as a company’s 
fair trial protection has also been at the core of EU competition law. Given 
this critical issue, the subsequent content will analyse the scope and intensity 
of the judicial review that the EU Courts can exercise, while ruling on the 
antitrust cases.84 
 
c. Judicial Review and the Commission’s Complex Economic 
Assessment 
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The judicial review of the amounts of fines in antitrust cases is more in-depth, 
because of the relationship between Article 261 of the TFEU and Article 31 
of Regulation 1/2003.85 However, following the ruling of the Otis and others, 
the EU Courts cannot use the Commission’s discretion power, which is 
usually related to a complex economic appraisal, and therefore the Courts 
would have a marginal review.86 This lighter scope and intensity of review 
consequently constitutes a doctrine of judicial deference of the EU Courts.87 
In fact, the EU Courts have shown its utmost judicial deference to the 
Commission in the cases of the commitments.88 The Alrosa case concerns the 
Commission’s decision object to commitments pursuant to Article 9 of 
Regulation 1/2003. The CJEU upheld the manifest error test, and it had left 
the Commission a wide margin of discretion when deciding whether or not to 
accept commitments. However, this case of decisions concerning the 
imposition of fines for infringements of Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU is 
fundamentally different from the commitments.89  
The Commission has the decision-making power to carry out a complex 
economic appraisal in the infringements of Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU. 
It follows that the loss of this decision-making power may be problematic as 
it undermines the authority’s policy-making functions.90 As a consequence, 
an introduction of a marginal review is generated, when the EU Courts 
examine elements and factors of the Commission’s decisions that have been 
adopted in consideration of a margin of appreciation that the decision-maker 
legally holds. The EU Courts would thus restrain themselves to justifying 
whether the Commission’s acts have been compliant with the procedural rules 
and whether there have been any manifest errors.91 It could be argued that the 
marginal review of the EU Courts is focused on two main issues: reviewing 
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the finding of infringements and reviewing the amount of fines by the 
Commission. This article will therefore evaluate to what extent the EU Courts 
are entitled to control the decisions from these two perspectives.  
Firstly, regarding the marginal review of infringing Article 101(1) of the 
TFEU, according to Remia, judicial review would be restricted to justifying 
whether the statement of reasons for the decision is appropriate, as well as 
assessing whether there has been a manifest error of appraisal or a misuse of 
powers.92 It is notable that the identical standard of judicial review has also 
been applied to exemption decisions under Article 101(3) of the TFEU based 
on Van den Bergh.  
This marginal review was extended to Article 102 of the TFEU which 
assesses where there is an abuse of dominance as well. For instance, in 
Microsoft93 and AstraZeneca94, the GC had to review the definition of the 
market on which the existence of a dominant position would be determined. 
The GC applied the marginal review in respect of the Commission’s analysis 
relating to the abuse. The Court referred to the Deutsche Telekom95 and the 
Wanadoo96 cases and ruled that the calculations of margin squeeze and 
recovery of costs of predatory pricing on markets were upraised to the 
Commission’s discretionary power to carry out complex economic 
assessments.97 
With respect to reviewing the amount of fines, the Commission has a 
considerable margin of discretion according to Regulation 1/2003, the Fining 
Guidelines and Leniency Notice and the case law of the Commission. This 
broad margin of discretion may contradict with the GC’s unlimited 
jurisdiction under Article 261 of the TFEU and Article 31 of Regulation 
1/2003. This unlimited jurisdiction legalises the GC to reduce, increase or 
cancel the fines. Although many companies appealed to the CJEU that the 
GC had failed to exercise its unlimited jurisdiction in dealing with the 
Commission’s discretion regarding the amount of fines, the CJEU ruled in 
both the Chalkor and Schindler cases that the GC cannot substitute the 
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Commission, on the grounds that the application of the Fining Guidelines and 
the Leniency Notice both belong within the Commission’s margin of 
discretion.98 
To sum up, provided in Menarini, it is clear that the decisive factor for the 
compliance with Article 6(1) of the ECHR is whether or not the judicial body 
actually exercises its full jurisdiction when reviewing the administrative first-
instance decision.99 In view of the case law of the CJEU, it is admitted that 
the GC did not infringe the right to a fair trial protected by Article 6(1) of the 
ECHR.100 In other words, this indeed complies with the principle of effective 
judicial protection by the GC, because the Court has in fact exercised a 
comprehensive review of the law and of the facts, and the complex economic 
assessment does not fall within the scope of the Court’s judicial review. 
Section IV will provide a further analysis concerning the scope and intensity 
of the GC’s judicial review. 
3. Companies’ Fundamental Rights to be Heard 
 
There are a number of procedural rights and safeguards, which are derived 
from the EUCFR, restricting the Commission’s powers of investigation. 
Good administration, or due process guarantees, is one of the procedural 
rights standards protected in Article 41 paragraph 2 (a) of the EUCFR. The 
due process guarantees support the proposition that the Commission carries a 
general duty to undertake a fair and impartial examination in dealing with 
complaints.101 These procedural rights turn to be more and more essential and 
appear to establish a significant principle of fundamental rights protection in 
the EU competition enforcement.102 For example, as to show the respect for 
the rights of defence, in Orkem, the CJEU ruled that the Commission cannot 
force undertakings to admit that they have constituted antitrust infringements 
of Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU.103 Moreover, the Nexans case affirmed 
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the guarantees of companies’ fundamental rights to defence in the 
Commission’s inspection.104 
In the context of EU law, it would be difficult to provide a clear account of 
the notion defining due process guarantees.105 However, the due process 
rights could be established within the principle of natural justice of audi 
alteram partem.106 The case law of the EU Courts consequently states that the 
rule of audi alteram partem has acquired the status of “objective or absolute 
standard of good administration”.107 It is recognised that there is no general 
applicable framework of fair administrative procedures stipulated either by 
the EU treaties or by the legislature, albeit a number of rules of procedures 
have been dictated by EU law in specific areas.108 Nevertheless, early in 
Hoffmann-La Roche the CJEU indicated that a fundamental principle of EU 
law is the recognition of the due process rights in administrative proceedings 
that possibly result in sanctions.109 The CJEU further upheld that companies’ 
fundamental rights of defence expand to the Commission’s preliminary 
investigation procedures.110  
Among these procedural protections, the significance of the right to be heard 
as related to companies’ fundamental rights in the EU competition 
enforcement system has vastly developed and therefore drawn the 
attention.111 The Commission’s practice proved that the right to be heard has 
become an essential component of the rights of defence of the suspected 
companies. Furthermore, the kind of rights of defence has led to a particular 
responsibility imposed on the Commission to ‘observe the procedural 
safeguards provided for by EU law’.112 
 
In view of the case law, the National Panasonic case was involved in a claim 
by National Panasonic for the validity of the Commission’s competition 
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inspections at its office and a request for the return of the documents taken 
from its premises. Another issue in this case concerns whether or not the 
Commission’s action violated the companies’ right to be heard within an 
inspection process.113 In the judgment of National Panasonic, the CJEU held 
that between the Commission’s decisions taken in the exercise of 
investigatory powers and those taken to terminate an infringement, there is a 
substantive difference.114 The distinction stated by the CJEU is that the 
inspections processed by the Commission carry the intention to enable it to 
collect the necessary evidence so as to assess the real existence and scope of 
a given legal and factual situation. Hence, the Commission is not required to 
carry out a communication with the undertaking before reaching a decision 
ordering an investigation, as not to affect the lawfulness of the information 
collected.115  
The judgment additionally stated that, with regard to the validity of the 
Commission’s investigation and the companies’ fundamental rights, 
provisions related to investigatory decisions under Articles 18 and 20 of 
Regulation 1/2003 may be carried out by the Commission without having to 
uphold the investigated undertakings’ right to be heard. This implies that the 
due process rights are not affected in respect of investigated powers, since the 
Commission is only focused on the ‘collection of the necessary 
information’.116  
Having discussed the National Panasonic case, this does not necessarily 
illustrate that the principle of due process cannot be applied in the 
enforcement system of Articles 18 and 20 of Regulation 1/2003. In other 
words, the assessments of these provisions will concern whether or not there 
are procedural rights and safeguards applicable to suspected undertakings, 
insomuch as administrative due process principles are enshrined in the 
ECHR.117 
Despite the debate for an overprotected procedural rights in competition 
enforcement, it could be contested that there is a rather limited possibility to 
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have access to the oral hearing. Such limitation results in several concerns.118 
The cases in which third parties are involved in for a clarification and further 
examination of complaints can demonstrate the problematic issues. 
Accordingly, Alrosa is a recent case concerning the third party’s right to be 
heard.119 Alrosa was not a simple interested third party in the case, yet it was 
the party having a contractual relationship with De Beers in a long term. The 
CJEU analysed Alrosa’s rights to be heard in the administrative proceeding. 
Accordingly, it held that Alrosa should have been considered as an 
‘undertaking concerned’.120 Having been widely recognised by EU law, the 
right to be heard is a general principle of the law in all kinds of proceedings, 
and such a right is liable to terminate a measure which may affect the person 
in question.121 Because the Commission had altered its mind, after having 
published draft commitments which it had been ready to accept, the 
Commission carried a responsibility to hear the parties’ comments on the 
observations of third parties. Moreover, the Commission is able to change its 
mind only if the facts had altered or its initial assessment was established on 
wrongful information. Therefore, the CJEU upheld that Alrosa had a right to 
be heard on the extra commitment offered by De Beers, and Alrosa had not 
been granted such a right completely.122 
To conclude, the implication of the National Panasonic and Alrosa cases is 
that due process rights in competition proceedings are considered 
important.123 The National Panasonic judgment indicated that companies’ 
fundamental rights to be heard should be protected only in the circumstance 
to terminate an infringement. However, this does not mean that due process 
rights cannot be applied in Articles 18 or 20 of Regulation 1/2003. Indeed, 
due process guarantees play an essential role in EU competition enforcement 
scheme as to protect company defendants. Although the protection of the right 
to be heard seems sufficient, there are some issues regarding the completeness 
of the statement of objection and the involvement of the Hearing Officer in 
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antitrust cases.124 The matter of contentions will be evaluated in the next 
section. 
 
 
IV. Legal Analysis and an Outlook 
 
As discussed in Section III on the companies’ fundamental rights protection 
within competition proceedings, it may be concluded that the Commission is 
permitted by the ECHR and the EU treaties to act both as an investigator and 
as a decision maker. However, this permission from the case law does not 
indicate that the Commission is able to unrestrictedly carry out its 
investigatory and decision-making powers. A number of internal checks and 
procedural guarantees have illustrated their functions in protecting fairness in 
the EU administrative proceedings. They can be exemplified by, firstly, 
Regulation 773/2004 and other procedural rights guarantees, such as the best 
practice guidelines on competition proceedings that have all bound the 
Commission’s enforcement abilities. Secondly, the possibility of the GC 
exercising its full jurisdiction concerning fines in competition enforcement 
constrains the Commission’s powers. In this section, the current practice and 
debates regarding these two main contentions will be evaluated in this article. 
1. Ensuring Full Respect for a Fair Hearing 
 
In the context of protecting the right to be heard, Article 14(1) of Regulation 
773/2004 provides that hearings shall be conducted by a fully independent 
Hearing Officer. The role of Hearing Officer was established in 1982, and it 
has dramatically changed in the last decade.125 The essential function of the 
Hearing Officer is to contribute to the impartiality, objectivity, transparency 
and efficiency of the competition proceedings, by giving the Hearing officer 
competences and responsibilities to ensure the concerned undertakings’ rights 
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to be heard.126 Therefore, he or she can not only conduct the oral hearing, but 
also is also empowered to exercise a full review of the Commission’s 
investigation team’s decision, and modify it if necessary.127 The New Hearing 
Officer Mandate in 2011 has demonstrated the power of protecting 
companies’ rights in procedural matters between the Commission’s 
investigation team and suspected undertakings and the third parties subject to 
the proceedings.128 
In addition to the Hearing Officer’s important function in protecting the 
procedural rights, the creation in 2011 of the Commission’s Best Practices 
Package on the proceedings concerning the application of antitrust and 
merger cases has brought about numerous benefits. The Commission has 
published the Best Practices in antitrust proceedings of Articles 101 and 102 
of the TFEU,129 Best Practices on submission of economic evidence 
(hereafter collectively referred to as “Best Practices Package”).130 The 
purposes of these new measures are to strengthen procedural guarantees and 
transparency, while respecting for the need for efficient enforcement 
proceedings. In line with the Best Practices Package, the Hearing Officer 
provided a plain classification for two dissimilar types of procedural rights 
protection during the competition proceedings. There are two kinds of 
procedural guarantees in this Best Practices Package. The first category 
focuses on the rights of defence, which concern the truth and relevance of the 
facts and the documents used by the Commission for inspection.131 The 
second category is related to procedural rights of complainants.132 The right 
to a fair hearing as well as the right to a fair trial derived from the protection 
of the EUCFR, are both within the group of rights of defence and therefore 
compliant with the general principle of EU law.133 Although the Best 
Practices Packages does not change the Commission, it has led to a number 
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of changes in its previous practice.134 It could therefore be concluded that the 
Best Practices Packages provides more certainty and transparency, and it 
delineates clearer stages and phases to the competition proceedings.135  
Despite the full independence of Hearing Officer and the advantages of the 
Best Practice Package, the current framework of oral hearing raises a lot of 
issues. Many competition law practitioners suggest for strengthening the 
Hearing Officer’s function to ensure a full respect for a fair hearing.136 
Several stakeholders of companies have claimed for an earlier and wider 
Hearing Officer’s involvement, while the others advocated for improving the 
transparency of the competition proceedings. In response to these requests, 
Albers and Jourdan provided a neutral opinion which did not take sides, yet 
emphasised the significance of the EUCFR.137 They pointed out that due to 
the envisaged EU’s accession to the ECHR, the competition procedure shall 
change to show respect for the increased fundamental rights protection.138 In 
my opinion, this concluding remark is convincing, for the reason that the 
development of numerous policies in competition law is in support of 
fundamental rights protection in the EU. As there is few judgment questioning 
the competition law procedure, this argument would let the EU Courts 
reconsider its current case law.139  
2. The Scope and Intensity of the GC’s Judicial Review 
 
There is increased criticism of the EU competition enforcement and review 
mechanisms applicable at the level of the EU, from the perspectives of the 
institutional hierarchy of the Commission and the potential for judicial review 
of its decisions in competition cases before the EU Courts. In other words, 
due to the institutional design and the concurrent powers of investigation and 
decision-making in the Commission concerning Regulation 1/2003, it could 
be argued that the Commission as an institution does not uphold the standards 
of Article 6(1) of the ECHR for a ‘fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
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time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law’.140 
Commentators advised that the full jurisdictional control exercised by the EU 
courts over an interpretation of law derives from their function that is within 
the institutional framework of the EU. Review of law thus gives power to the 
GC to interpret the law and then assess whether the legal principles are 
correctly applied by the Commission to cases.141  
By contrast, if the competition cases appealed by the companies challenge the 
Commission’s complex economic assessments, the EU courts may become 
less forceful. In the case, Società Italiana Vetro SpA and Others142, the GC 
provided a reserved stand and ruled that if any further extensive powers of 
review were conferred to the court, this extension could interrupt the balance 
among the EU institutions and would therefore run the risk of prejudicing the 
companies’ rights of defence.143 One academic opinion claimed that although 
the Court must be empowered to review the legality of the Commission’s 
decisions, it cannot displace the role of the Commission as the administrative 
body which is authorised with particular and specific powers and expertise.144 
In addition, the principle of separation of powers demonstrates that the 
function of the EU Courts is to review, not to substitute, administrative 
authorities’ decisions.145 The Commission is thus responsible for carrying out 
the complex economic assessments required by the enforcement of 
competition law in the EU.146 The Commission’s appraisal of facts will be 
raised into question only if there has been a manifest error of assessment, the 
facts in competition cases have not been precisely stated or there has been any 
misuse of powers.147 
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With a view to the case law, it appears justifiable to argue that there is the 
necessity to guarantee the administrative power within the EU institutional 
framework and the nature of competition enforcement as requiring ‘complex 
economic assessments’. Consequently, the EU courts would exercise a 
limited review of the assessment of the evidence conducted by the 
Commission.148 Nonetheless, this concluding approach has led to the 
criticism that the components of a complex economic assessment might be 
unclear. In particular, while the Commission did not succeed in providing an 
adequate statement of reasons to support its decision, this situation caused an 
argument that the procedural and the substantial factors may be so actively 
connected as to become interdependent.149 
However, even if the Commission does not qualify the standards of an 
‘independent and impartial tribunal’, this should not be automatically 
considered as an adequate justification for any major alterations in the 
enforcement scheme of EU competition law. Pursuant to the standard 
interpretation of Article 6(1) of the ECHR, the requirement for a ‘fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law’ does not need to be met in the first instance, when 
an administrative body makes the initial decision by levying fines (even if 
they fall within the concept of ‘criminal charge’ under the ECHR).150 Article 
6(1) of the ECHR stipulates that the guarantees would be supported if the 
initial conviction can be evaluated before an institution qualifying the 
standards of Article 6(1) that can be evaluated before an institution qualifying 
the standards of Article 6(1) that can examine it on the merits of both the law 
and the facts. GRAELLS argues that this is in compliance with Article 13 of 
the ECHR as well, on the grounds that the available access to judicial review 
constitutes an effective remedy confronting any possible infringements of the 
fundamental rights of the companies concerning the conviction in the 
investigation led by the Commission.151 
 
One may consider that whether or not the current competition enforcement 
system shall be modified. In view of the evolving case law in the judgments 
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of KME152 and Chalkor153, the answer to whether any changes to the review 
of EU competition enforcement scheme are required for the compliance with 
Article 6(1) of the ECHR has been in tentatively negative tone.154 From the 
perspective of the CJEU, since the review before the EU Courts includes the 
review of law and facts, which means the Courts have the power to annul the 
Commission’s decisions and change the amount of fines, this implies that EU 
competition law is in accordance with Article 47 of the EUCFR and that there 
is no infringement of the standard of effective judicial protection in that 
provision. Moreover, in the current enforcement system, there are already 
sufficient guarantees of undertakings’ due process rights in investigations of 
competition matters. As a consequence, in Graells’ point of view, he claims 
that it is unnecessary to set up a more protective enforcement scheme, and he 
also states that there is sufficiency in the scope or intensity of judicial review 
in EU competition law cases.155  
Nonetheless, one discussion156 stemming from the implication of the 
Menarini judgment focused on whether or not the EU Courts really obtain 
‘full jurisdiction’ in respect of the Commission’s decisions to impose fines to 
cancel, reduce or increase the fines. In fact, executive institutions have some 
policy discretion, at least within the scope that they are granted by the 
legislature. By contrast, if the Commission exercises its discretionary power 
to decide a criminal penalty, this would be unacceptable from a perspective 
of fundamental rights. Subsequently, as the legality of a competition law fine 
relies on the full review by a court, an important issue arose: whether or not 
an appeal to the court should have an effect to suspend the obligation to pay 
the fine. More specifically, if an administrative criminal sanction is enforced 
without reviewing by a court, there is a question regarding whether this is 
consistent with the standard set out in Article 6 of the ECHR.  
 
Following the opinion above, it takes issue with Graells’ argument related to 
the lack of necessity for changes in the current enforcement scheme.157 This 
position implies that certain aspects of the current set-up are difficult to 
accord with a fair trial. Regarding the high-fine imposition cases, some 
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scholars argued that since the Commissioners are not judges and the 
Commission itself is not a tribunal, there seems no opportunity to carry out 
the right to cross-examine and other rights usually protected in criminal law 
proceedings.158 Although Article 14(1) of the Implementing Regulation 
provides an oral hearing as an internal guarantee to avoid the Commission’s 
manifest error, the issue is that this hearing is not compulsory. Moreover, the 
position of the Hearing Officer does not separate from the Commission. 
Given that the Commission actually has the competition policy to defend and 
to win the antitrust cases, it is thus difficult to accept that the Commission 
having such internal policy could set an effective brake on these inherent 
biases, while making decisions on fine sanction. Furthermore, suspected 
companies would face the fear of severe fines, and they are unable to appeal 
their case prior to the first-instance decision.159  
 
As a result, should the Commission’s power to issue criminal sanctions be 
condemned as contrary to the principles of a fair trial, and should a transfer 
of decision-making power to the courts be required, it would be impossible 
to distinguish between efficient and inefficient judiciaries in the EU. Prior to 
expanding this fundamental rights argument to the widest scope, it seems 
necessary to make sure that courts in the EU as a whole are ready to enforce 
competition law. In other words, an approximation of fairness for a 
transitional period might have to be accepted, with improvements being 
implemented to the administrative process, so as not to jeopardise the 
effectiveness of competition law.160 Simultaneously, in those countries where 
courts operate effectively, a transfer of decision-making power from the 
competition authorities to the courts could have already been put in motion. 
Indeed, this is a change from the initial set-up of EU competition enforcement 
system.  
 
It could therefore be concluded that changes in competition enforcement seem 
unnecessary. However, many academics have discussed the advantages of 
establishing a professional and independent competition law court.161 The 
creation and development of the UK’s Competition Appeal Tribunal, which 
is a specialised administrative body, has subsequently been evaluated. The 
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decisions of the Competition and Markets Authority can be appealed to the 
Tribunal, which carries out a review on fines as well as a control of legality, 
of merger decisions.162 Nonetheless, it may be contested that whether Article 
257 of the TFEU empowers to establish an EU competition court.163  
 
 
3. Balance between Effective Enforcement and Companies’ 
Procedural Rights 
 
Having regard to the analysis above, it might be admitted that companies’ 
rights in competition proceedings are protected and this practice has met the 
requirement under Article 6(1) of the ECHR. The judicial deference may 
benefit the Commission’s enforcement, yet an issue related to the 
maintenance of the current judicial review occurs.164 Furthermore, one may 
need to think of the balance between the effective enforcement and the 
sufficient protection of fundamental rights. This article would support a more 
effective enforcement, which benefits the market and consumers. 
Firstly, there is an emerging debate concerning the extent and intensity to 
which companies’ rights have not been excessively protected in competition 
enforcement system.165 Commentators have claimed that granting a complete 
due process guarantee to companies is not necessary, and the recognition of 
all due process safeguards would impair the effectiveness of competition 
enforcement. Furthermore, the opinion of Graells and Marcos argued that EU 
competition law nevertheless plays a key role in maintaining one of the 
fundamental safeguards of the undistorted market economy, and thus this 
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excessive due process rights protections will lead to a less efficient market 
economy.166  
With respect to the due process rights, although there are internal checks and 
balances, they do not constitute formal proceedings followed by stringent 
procedural protections. Consequently, these internal guarantees would still 
have to be examined by the EU competition enforcement system. It then 
caused a problem that the Commission’s internal procedures cannot recover 
the inadequacies of the broader enforcement model. Accordingly, the kind of 
procedural rights protection would deteriorate the due process system.167 
Having addressed these problems, effective competition enforcement 
outweighs the further protection of fundamental rights.  
 
V. Conclusions 
 
This article has provided a framework of how the EU established its 
fundamental rights legal order and, to a further extent, analysed the current 
protection of companies’ fundamental rights. In line with the case law, the 
ECHR is applicable to both natural and legal persons; therefore, companies 
are subject to the safeguards afforded by the ECHR. Companies’ fundamental 
rights are particularly protected in competition proceedings, which are carried 
out by the Commission. As the justice and fairness in administrative 
proceeding becomes far more important in the EU, companies, as antitrust 
defendants, may defend their fundamental rights according to a strong basis 
of law and regulation. Moreover, the EUCFR is now bound to the EU, which 
means that the EU should show respect for the fundamental rights order and 
comply with the Charter. Accordingly, the critical points of companies’ 
fundamental rights to a fair trial and a fair hearing in competition proceeding 
has generated a large number of legal debates. 
 
The issues concerning the competition enforcement and its compliance with 
the ECHR have been examined in this work. In accordance with the results 
of Section II’s assessments, it is clear that the current competition 
enforcement is compliant with Article 6(1) of the ECHR, and it is unnecessary 
to amend the enforcement procedures. In addition, with the recent creation of 
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the Best Practice Package concerning antitrust cases, this internal check in the 
Commission plays a key role in helping to maintain the fairness of 
competition proceedings. The Hearing Officer’s new mandate as of 2011 
strengthens companies’ procedural rights and makes the procedures more 
transparent and reliable. The entire unprecedented competition policy seems 
to ensure the complete respect for a fair hearing, in spite of the contested 
independence of the Hearing Officer in the Commission.  
 
With regard to the controversy of the judicial review involved in the matters 
of fines, the EU Courts are empowered by the legal basis derived from 
Articles 263 and 261 of the TFEU and Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003 to 
exercise their full jurisdiction. By contrast, while the Commission conducts 
an economic appraisal to investigate and judge the antitrust cases, the need 
for a complex economic assessment is undoubtedly part of the Commission’s 
discretionary powers in deciding the finding of the infringements and the 
subsequent fines as sanctions. Accordingly, a legal question arose: whether 
EU courts truly have unlimited jurisdiction to review the antitrust cases. In 
view of the principle of separation of powers within EU law, it is argued that 
the EU Courts cannot substitute the Commission. Thus, the EU Courts can 
only exercise marginal review, and they are restricted in justifying whether 
the Commission’s decisions are inappropriate and whether there is a manifest 
error of assessment or misuse of powers of the Commission. 
 
In fact, as administrative bodies have some policy discretion in execution, 
they ought to comply with the framework and objectives of the policy. 
Regulation 1/2003 authorises investigation, prosecution and adjudicate 
powers to the Commission; hence, the Commission is the essential authority 
to deal with and penalise antitrust infringements. However, determining to 
what extent the Commission can exercise its discretion in the effective 
competition enforcement without violating the companies’ fundamental 
rights is difficult. Usually, the solutions vary, due to the dissimilar and diverse 
facts of cases, and this makes the problem even more complicated. Some have 
discussed the advantages of a specialised and independent competition law 
court. The UK’s Competition Appeal Tribunal would thus become a model. 
Nonetheless, due to the EU treaties’ restriction, creating a specialised 
competition law court would be challenging. 
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In conclusion, the EU indeed has to provide sufficient respect to EU 
fundamental rights law, particularly due to the EUCFR’s binding effects on 
the EU. In other words, an intensive balance between an effective EU 
competition enforcement and companies’ fundamental rights protection is 
required. As the fundamental rights protection is one of the general principles 
of EU law, the enforcement cannot be excessive and cause a violation of 
companies’ fundamental rights. While there is a tension between an 
authority’s powers and defendants’ fundamental rights, the author argues that 
a powerful and effectively implemented enforcement system should prevail 
over the fundamental rights protection, which currently has considerable 
value in the EU. One reason is that a well-functioning internal market in the 
EU still requires complete and sound supervision from the Commission, 
which has a combination of various powers in dealing with antitrust 
infringements. Another factor to support this claim is that the enforcement 
scheme is ultimately beneficial to the entire society and consumers, and this 
perhaps demonstrates another aspect of fundamental rights protection.
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